* Krashen 4: Open Letter 2

critic

Open Letter No. 2 to Stephen Krashen

Dear Stephen,

Let me begin by saying that I think you’re right about a lot of important issues. It is now generally agreed that most language learning is unconscious, that comprehensible input is vital for learning and that a teacher’s most important job is to provide that input. Whether or not because of what you say about an affective filter, it’s also generally recognised that affective barriers can prevent successful SLA and that a teacher should make every effort to lower those barriers.

In this post, I want to outline the main criticisms I have of your theory, making frequent references to Gregg (1984), who isn’t of course responsible for how I interpret his paper. I’ll then wait for you to response, and after that I’ll try to deal with all the responses you’ve made recently, and to bring the threads of this discussion together. My intention will be to present your theory in its best possible form and to compare it with other current theories of SLA. Readers might want to check my summary of your Monitor Model (scroll down from here to the post “Newsflash: Krashen Well …..”) before proceeding.

Acquisition versus Learning

The Acquisition/Learning Hypothesis “states that adults have two distinct and independent ways of developing competence in a second language” (Krashen, 1982:10): acquisition, which is “subconscious”, and learning, which is conscious.

First, what makes you posit that two completely separate systems (presumably each with its own neuro-physiological basis) are used for language learning? This offends Occam’s razor and is generally implausible.

Second, you claim that adults can access the same natural language acquisition device that children use (1982:10), but your language acquisition device seems to operate in a different way to Chomsky’s language acquisition devise (LAD). As Gregg (1984) argues, the language acquisition device you talk about seems to equate with unconscious acquisition of any sort, whereas for Chomsky the mind is modular and the LAD is but one of various ‘mental organs’ that interact with each other and with input data to produce linguistic competence. Furthermore, Chomsky’s LAD is intended to describe the child’s initial state, before being presented with primary linguistic data, and is constrained by UG. So please could you explain how “your” language acquisition device operates, and how it differs from Chomsky’s LAD.

Third, if adults use the same device to acquire a second language as children use in L1 acquisition, one would expect adults to acquire a second language as successfully as children acquire language. Your explanation for why they don’t is as follows:

The filter hypothesis explains why it is possible for an acquirer to obtain a great deal of comprehensible input, and yet stop short (and sometimes quite short) of the native speaker level… When this occurs, it is due to the affective filter.. .. Child-adult differences in attainment are not due to any change in the “language acquisition device” (LAD) but are due to the filter… (Krashen, 1982:32, 45).

This implies that provided adults acquiring a second language get enough of the right kind of input, they should become as competent as children become, and if they don’t, it’s because they have some affective difficulty: lack of motivation, dislike of the culture of the target language’s speakers, whatever. One can readily accept that affective factors play an important role in SLA, but it’s hard to accept that the Affective Filter provides a complete explanation for differences in child and adult language acquisition. I suggest that children’s L1 Acquisition is very different to adult SLA, that your distinction between acquisition and learning is wrong, and that the Affective Filter Hypothesis (discussed below) is an ad hoc hypothesis, bolted on to rescue the important Acquisition/Learning Hypothesis and the Input Hypothesis from criticism.

Forth, in Krashen 1981,1982,1983, 1985, you claim that “learning” cannot become “acquisition”. This is informally challenged by just about everybody who has learnt a second language. Reports by Gregg (1984), Schmidt (1990), and Thornbury (2013), among many, support the claim that the conscious learning of rules, and the presentation of rules, explanation, corrective feedback, etc., can facilitate the acquisition of a second language, as do studies by Ellis (1994a; 1994b), Fotos (1994); Hulstijn (2005), Lyster and Saito (2010), to mention just a few. So, the burden is on you to disprove the intuitively obvious proposition that learning can become acquisition. Are you able to do so?

Fifth, many critics, including Gregg (1984) and McLaughlin (1978) say that you don’t clarify what you mean by “conscious” and “subconscious”. Specifically, does “subconscious” mean “not accessible to the conscious”, or simply “not conscious at a given moment”? Does “conscious” entail “incapable of becoming unconscious”? If you define the “subconscious” as inaccessible, and conscious “learning” as always accessible, then the claim that learning does not become acquisition is of course true, but only trivially so because you make it so. But if (some) unconscious knowledge can be brought to consciousness, and if conscious knowledge is capable of becoming unconscious, then unless you offer evidence, which you don’t, there’s no reason to accept your claim.

Finally, you say that acquisition “always (sic) requires large amounts of time and input data”, but you don’t give any evidence for this claim. There are many examples (see Gregg, 1984 for some) of acquistion which is fast and requires little input data.

The Monitor

In your 1982 work you say “Learning has only one function, and that is as a Monitor, or editor”. In Krashen 1981,1982,1983, 1985, you clearly state that the Monitor Hypothesis claims that “learning” is available only for use in production, not in comprehension. Last week in our exchange on this blog, I asked you “Is it right to say that the Monitor hypothesis claims that learning is available for use in production, but not in comprehension?” You replied “NO. It is available as a Monitor, but it is possible that conscious knowledge can make input more comprehensible. There has been no investigation of this possibility, to my knowledge”. I don’t get this and I hope you’ll address it in a reply. For the moment let me say that, in my opinion, the claim made for the Monitor (as I still understand it from re-reading your work) is an extraordinary one for which you offer no evidence. We may note that McLaughlin (1978) makes the same point, and that you don’t deal with it in your reply (1979) to him.

Gregg gives this example as evidence against your claim:

“The other day while listening to the radio, I heard the announcer announce wagunaa no kageki, kamigami no kasoware. Knowing that kageki = ‘opera’ and that kami = either ‘god’ or ‘hair’ or ‘paper’, and knowing that there is a (fairly unproductive) rule in Japanese for pluralizing by reduplication, I concluded that kamigami must be the plural of kami ‘god’, that therefore wagunaa must be Wagner and kasoware must mean ‘twilight,’ and that I as in danger of hearing Die Gotterdammerung. Of course I was not quite right: there is no word kasoware, it’s tasogare. But the point is that I was using a rule that I had ‘learned’ (and never used productively), and using that rule consciously (and quickly enough to turn the radio off in time). … Of course I was using acquired knowledge, but I was also consciously making use of rules that I had “learned”. Which suggests that “learning” can indeed be used in comprehension, as no one before Krashen would have doubted.”

Do you insist that learning cannot be used in comprehension?

The extreme conditions you impose on Monitor use means that, as you say “for most people, even university students, it takes a real discrete-point grammar-type test to meet all three conditions for Monitor use .. .’ (1982:18). This suggests that under normal conditions, the Monitor isn’t used, which, coupled with the fact that the Input Hypothesis claims that we learn a language through comprehension, throws doubt on the Acquisition / Learning distinction. The “two distinct and independent ways” adults have of developing competence in a second language are extremely lop-sided: “learning” in your model accounts for very little indeed of the SLA process.

The Natural Order Hypothesis

The Natural Order Hypothesis suggests that “Second language acquirers acquire (not learn) grammatical structures in a predictable order” (Krashen 1980:169). Your case is based mainly on results of morpheme studies, but, as Gregg (1984) and Wode et.al.(1978) point out, the acquisition of morphemes in the same order doesn’t entail that the acquisition of, for example, relative pronouns, indirect object placement, or epistemic modals is ordered, either in respect to those grammatical morphemes, or in respect to each other. In recognition of this objection, you say in a footnote “Wode et al (1978) note that ordering studies might be overly concerned with determining relative order of acquisition of items that are formally quite different’ (1981:63).

If we took a simple view of the Natural Order Hypothesis we would suppose that the learner acquiring the thousands of structures of English does so by progressing from the first to the latest, starting from Structure 1 and reaching, let’s say, Structure 1,678. You say that “a strictly linear view of the natural order hypothesis, that there is only one stream of progress that acquirers follow in strict sequence” is incorrect. Rather, “several streams of development are taking place at the same time” (1982:53-4). But you give no explanation of what a “stream of development” could be, or set any limit on the number of such “streams”. Let me quote Gregg (1984) again:

If the structures of English are divided into varying numbers of ordered sets, the number of sets varying according to the individual, then it makes little sense to talk about a ‘natural order’. If the number of sets varies from individual to individual; then the membership of any given set will also vary, which makes it very difficult to compare individuals, especially since the content of these sets is virtually completely unknown. If the set of sets of structures is claimed to be invariant across individual – that is, if it is claimed that there is one (unknown) fixed number of ‘streams of development’ – the problem of comparability would be removed, but the problem of empirical support for the hypothesis remains; in fact it becomes even greater. If on the other hand one rejects the criterion of comparability across individuals, the Natural Order Hypothesis has no empirical content: for any individual it would claim that the acquisition of structure n+ 1 was the next structure to be acquired, and this would be true ex hypothesis, but it would be impossible to prove it or falsify it.

Another issue is the utility of this hypothesis. What is it for? The hypothesis can hardly be used to organize a syllabus which coincides with the natural order because nobody knows what this natural order is. And in any case, you have always rejected grammatical sequencing as an organising principle for an ELT syllabus. By the way, the fact that nobody knows what the natural order of English structures is (plus the fact that nobody knows when the monitor is working and when it’s not) makes “finding a natural accuracy order in a highly monitored situation, or finding an unnatural accuracy order in a spontaneous unmonitored situation” impossible. The attempt to “show a change in the natural order related to affect” is similarly bound to fail. These were 2 examples you gave in reply to my request for a conterexample which would falsify your hypotheses.

The Input Hypothesis

The Input Hypothesis claims that we acquire by understanding language that contains structure a bit beyond our current level of competence (i+ 1). This is done with the help of context or extra-linguistic information. When communication is successful, when the input is understood and there is enough of it, i+1 will be provided automatically.

One claim which comes from this hypothesis is that output does not help acquisition, except indirectly. Where is the evidence for this surprising claim, which contradicts the common opinion (which may of course be totally unfounded) that practice is necessary for second language acquisition? Why do you assume that learners can’t learn from their own utterances?

A second claim is that we acquire a previously unacquired structure if and only if that structure is present in input that we understand; that structure is ‘due’ to be acquired next; and that structure is presented (in understood input) sufficiently often. Since we don’t know when a structure is ready to be acquired, and since you give no definition of “ready”, this claim can’t be either supported or challenged by empirical evidence.

In general, what evidence supports the assertion that acquisition is caused by understanding comprehensible input? What theory explains how we go from understanding to acquisition? Without addressing these issues, the Input Hypothesis has no explanatory power.

The Affective Filter Hypothesis

The Affective Filter Hypothesis claims that there is such a thing as an affective filter, which is ‘that part of the internal processing system that subconsciously screens incoming language based on… the learner’s motives, needs, attitudes, and emotional states’ (Dulay, Burt, and Krashen 1 982:46). The hypothesis also claims that ‘the effect of affect is “outside” the language acquisition device proper’ (Krashen 1982:32).

As mentioned above, the Affective Filter is supposed to explain incomplete mastery of a second language by adults, and so the question arises why doesn’t the Filter work in children? You’ve said that that “significant Monitor use is only possible after the acquirer has undergone formal operations a stage in cognitive development that generally occurs at about puberty” and that “Having reached this stage, the adolescent now has a meta-awareness of his ideas and can use abstract rules to solve a whole class of problems at one time. It is thus plausible that the ability to use a conscious grammar … comes as a result of formal operations” (1981:35). Crucial to this otherwise very unconvincing account are “formal operations”. What are they?

You say the Filter determines which parts of the language will be attended to first. What does “part of a language” mean? How does the Filter recognize different “parts of a language”?

In general, you don’t explain either the growth or function of the Affective Filter, or provide any evidence for its existence.

A theory of language

Gregg (1984) insists that “a theory of second language acquisition must include a linguistic theory if it is to have any value as a theory”. He says: “Aside from throwing out a reference to ‘LAD’ from time to time, Krashen has no such theory, and this is what makes him unable to interpret the morpheme studies, or to present a coherent account of what ‘i+ 1’ could mean. As Chomsky says, ‘It is absolutely suicidal for a field to define itself the way psychology of language almost invariably does, as dealing with processes but not with the structures that might enter into them, or to deal with the observed stages of growth and development, but not with the systems that underlie them’ (Chomsky 1982:69)”.

A theory of SLA

Here, I repeat the criticisms I made in my original post. Firstly, most of the propositions in your theory are not capable of being subjected to an empirical test. There is no way of testing the Acquisition-Learning hypothesis since you give no evidence to support the claim that two distinct systems exist, or any means of determining whether they are, or are not, separate. Similarly, there is no way of testing the Monitor hypothesis: with no way to determine whether the Monitor is in operation or not, it is impossible to determine the validity of its claims. The Input Hypothesis is equally incapable of being tested: the levels of knowledge are nowhere defined and so it is impossible to know whether i + 1 is present in input, and, if it is, whether or not the learner moves on to the next level as a result.

Secondly, you provide no causal explanation. At the heart of the hypotheses is the Acquisition-Leaning Hypothesis which simply states that L2 competence is picked up through comprehensible input in a staged, systematic way, without giving any explanation of the process by which comprehensible input leads to acquisition. Similarly, you give no account of how the Affective Filter works, of how input is filtered out by an unmotivated learner.

Thirdly, your use of key terms, such as “acquisition and learning”, and “subconscious and conscious”, is vague, confusing, and not always consistent.

Fourthly, I think the theory is contained in the Input Hypothesis and the Monitor Hypothesis, and that the other hypotheses serve to rescue these two hypotheses from criticism. This implies that the theory offends the principle of Occam’s Razor, which expects theories to use the simplest possible formula and to postulate the fewest number of basic types of entity.

Finally, I should mention your response to one of my questions to you last week. You said:

According to a pure Popperian view the hundreds of confirmations of the hypotheses count for nothing – but I think they are good evidence supporting the hypotheses. EG: More comprehensible input consistently results in better competence in adult second language, child second language, native language, literacy. Comprehension-based methods have won EVERY method-comparison study ever done, for beginners and intermediates, sustained silent reading is a steady winner in L1 and L2 studies over traditional literacy instruction (in some short term studies, there is no difference, which makes sense, it takes a while for students to find a book), in multivariate studies self-selected reading is always a strong predictor of competence on several tests while instruction does poorly. There are no exceptions. Any exception would be serious counter-evidence to the comprehension hypothesis.

I agree entirely that supporting evidence is extremely inportant when assessing a hypothesis or theory (and I thus expect you to give evidence in support of the assertions made in your theory). Of course, Popper himself did not dismiss the need for supporting evidence, and, furthermore, very few scholars in the field of the philosophy of science today accept the original strong version of the Falsifiability hypothesis. Pace Popper, scientific theories rely as much on inference (inference to the best explanation) as they do on deduction and testing for counter evidence. But we need more information in order to judge for ourselves whether the examples you give of confirmations of your hypotheses are robust. So, for example, when you say “More comprehensible input consistently results in better competence in adult second language, child second language, native language, literacy”, we need to know how you ensured that the input was comprehensible, how you measured “competence” before and after the trial, how strong the correlation was and how you are sure that the comprehensible input caused the increased competence.

There it is: “casi nada” as they say here. I look forward to your response.

Best,

Geoff

 

References

Chomsky, N. (1982) Noam Chomsky on the Generative Enterprise. The Netherlands: Foris.

Ellis, N.C. (1994a). Consciousness in second language learning: Psychological perspectives on the role of conscious processes in vocabulary acquisition. In Hulstijn, J.H. and R. Schmidt (eds.), Consciousness in Second Language Learning. AILA Review, 11, 37-56.

Ellis, N.C. (1994b). Implicit and Explicit Language Learning – An Overview. In Ellis, N.C. (ed.), Implicit and Explicit Learning of Languages (pp. 1-31). London: Academic Press Inc.

Fotos, S.S. (1994). Integrating Grammar Instruction and Communicative Language Use Through Grammar Consciousness-Raising Tasks. TESOL Quarterly, 28(2), 323-351.

Gregg, K. R. (1984) Krashen’s monitor and Occam’s razor. Applied Linguistics 5, 79-100.

Hulstijn, J. H. (2005). Theoretical and empirical issues in the study of implicit and explicit second language learning: introduction. Studies in Second Language Acquisition (special issues) 27: 129-140.

Hulstijn, J.H. and De Graaff. (1994). Under what conditions does explicit knowledge of a second language facilitate the acquisition of implicit knowledge? A research proposal. In Hulstijn, J.H. and R. Schmidt (eds.) (1994) Consciousness in Second Language Learning. AILA Review, 11, 97-112.

Hulstijn, J.H. and R. Schmidt (eds) (1994) (eds.) Consciousness in Second Language Learning. AILA Review, 11.

Krashen, S. (1978) Individual variation in the use of the monitor. In Ritchie, W. (ed.) Second language acquisition research: issues and implications. New York: Academic Press, 175-83.

Krashen, S. (1981) Second language acquisition and second language learning. Oxford: Pergamon.

Krashen, S. (1982) Principles and practice in second language acquisition. Oxford; Pergamon.

Krashen, S. (1985) The Input Hypothesis: Issues and Implications. New York: Longman.

Krashen, S. and Scarcella, R. (1978) On routines and patterns in second language acquisition and performance. Language Learning 28, 283—300.

Krashen, S. and Terrell, T. (1983) The natural approach: language acquisition in the Classroom. Hayward, CA: Alemany Press.

Nicola, M. (1991) Theories of Second Language Acquisition and of Physics: Pedagogical Implications. Dialog on Language Instruction Vol. 7, No.1, 17-27.

Li S. (2010) The effectiveness of corrective feedback in SLA: a meta-analysis. Language Learning 60/2: 309–65.

Lyster R. (2004) Differential effects of prompts and recasts in form-focused instruction. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 26/3: 399–432.

Lyster R., Ranta L. (1997) Corrective feedback and learner uptake. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 19/1: 37–66.

Lyster R., Saito K. (2010) Oral feedback in classroom SLA: a meta-analysis. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 32/2: 265–302.

Schmidt, R. (1990) The role of consciousness in second language learning. Applied Linguistics 11, 129-58.

Thornbury, S. (2013) The (de-) fossilization diaries. http://scottthornburyblog.com/

Wode, H., J. Bahns, H. Bedey, and W. Frank. (1978) Developmental sequence: an alternative approach to morpheme order. Language Learning, 28: 175-85.

 

Comments:

Mike (ELT Rants) says:

Lovely stuff, Geoff. This really got me thinking in a bunch of directions. One of them is about times when teachers talk about affect and the affective filter as though it is the only thing and the only answer and the only reason students might not be making progress. One thing I have noted is that this is most often used here in Korea to talk about reasons students are not using language productively. I think there can be a whole host of other reasons too though I surely don’t want to scoff at the impact of what is known as the affective filter. One thing that came to mind while reading this was the idea that if practice (producing) doesn’t actually matter much and that input is the key then why do we even care about the affective filter blocking production in class at all? Why waste the time worrying about high affective filters blocking production when production is not needed? Thanks for the thoughtful and thoughtproving post!

Re-reading the above, specifically, “The Affective Filter Hypothesis claims that there is such a thing as an affective filter, which is ‘that part of the internal processing system that subconsciously screens incoming language based on… the learner’s motives, needs, attitudes, and emotional states’ (Dulay, Burt, and Krashen 1 982:46). The hypothesis also claims that ‘the effect of affect is “outside” the language acquisition device proper’ (Krashen 1982:32)” maybe now I can see that it is intended to be about incoming language. Interesting. This is surely not the way I hear this term being used most of the time.

Geoff says:

Hi Mike,
Very good point: why bother about learners’ lack of motivation to practice speaking if output plays such a small role. But as your 2nd comment makes clear, Krashen is keen to explain why lots of comprehensible INPUT is not a sufficient condition for SLA – and the answer is that the Affective Filter stops the input “getting through”. Which, as I suggest, looks very much like an ad hoc hypothesis whose function is to rescue the main claim from otherwise unanswerable criticism.

Steven Krashen says:

June 6, 2014 at 2:26 am

Acquisition versus Learning
The Acquisition/Learning Hypothesis “states that adults have two distinct and independent ways of developing competence in a second language” (Krashen, 1982:10): acquisition, which is “subconscious”, and learning, which is conscious.
First, what makes you posit that two completely separate systems (presumably each with its own neuro-physiological basis) are used for language learning? This offends Occam’s razor and is generally implausible.
Second, you claim that adults can access the same natural language acquisition device that children use (1982:10), but your language acquisition device seems to operate in a different way to Chomsky’s language acquisition devise (LAD). As Gregg (1984) argues, the language acquisition device you talk about seems to equate with unconscious acquisition of any sort, whereas for Chomsky the mind is modular and the LAD is but one of various ‘mental organs’ that interact with each other and with input data to produce linguistic competence. Furthermore, Chomsky’s LAD is intended to describe the child’s initial state, before being presented with primary linguistic data, and is constrained by UG. So please could you explain how “your” language acquisition device operates, and how it differs from Chomsky’s LAD.
Third, if adults use the same device to acquire a second language as children use in L1 acquisition, one would expect adults to acquire a second language as successfully as children acquire language. Your explanation for why they don’t is as follows:
The filter hypothesis explains why it is possible for an acquirer to obtain a great deal of comprehensible input, and yet stop short (and sometimes quite short) of the native speaker level… When this occurs, it is due to the affective filter.. .. Child-adult differences in attainment are not due to any change in the “language acquisition device” (LAD) but are due to the filter… (Krashen, 1982:32, 45).

This implies that provided adults acquiring a second language get enough of the right kind of input, they should become as competent as children become, and if they don’t, it’s because they have some affective difficulty: lack of motivation, dislike of the culture of the target language’s speakers, whatever. One can readily accept that affective factors play an important role in SLA, but it’s hard to accept that the Affective Filter provides a complete explanation for differences in child and adult language acquisition. I suggest that children’s L1 Acquisition is very different to adult SLA, that your distinction between acquisition and learning is wrong, and that the Affective Filter Hypothesis (discussed below) is an ad hoc hypothesis, bolted on to rescue the important Acquisition/Learning Hypothesis and the Input Hypothesis from criticism.

***

MY RESPONSE: “THE PERFECTION FALLACY” = If it isn’t perfect, adult L2 acquisition must rely on different mechanisms.
The important fact about adult second language competence is that it is so good, not that it is imperfect. Adults, given enough comprehensible input and a reasonably supportive environment, typically acquire nearly the whole thing. Usually, adults only lack the cosmetic aspects of language, aspects of accent and morphology that mark you as a member of a social group.
Scholars have ignored this and rush to conclude that L1 and adult L2 acquisition are totally different, despite the high achievement of adults, despite findings that both exhibit a predictable sequence, and both are fueled by comprehensible input.
Also, there may be many “perfect” cases walking among us, unnoticed.

***

Forth, in Krashen 1981,1982,1983, 1985, you claim that “learning” cannot become “acquisition”. This is informally challenged by just about everybody who has learnt a second language. Reports by Gregg (1984), Schmidt (1990), and Thornbury (2013), among many, support the claim that the conscious learning of rules, and the presentation of rules, explanation, corrective feedback, etc., can facilitate the acquisition of a second language, as do studies by Ellis (1994a; 1994b), Fotos (1994); Hulstijn (2005), Lyster and Saito (2010), to mention just a few. So, the burden is on you to disprove the intuitively obvious proposition that learning can become acquisition. Are you able to do so?

***
MY RESPONSE:
The hypothesis that learning does not become aquisition It is challenged largely by academicians and other academic types who have dedicated their careers to grammar learning and grammar teaching. Most normal people have doubts about grammar (e.g. “I took five years of French and I can’t say anything.”).
As for the efficacy of explanation and feedback, please see Explorations (2004), and the work of Truscott on error correction (and on grammar instruction in general). I have provided explanations for all published cases of where it is claimed that conscious learning of rules seems to work. And the explanations are consistent with the constraints on the conscious Monitor. I published this first in 1989 (in Foreign Language Annals) and then again in an expanded version in 2004 (Explorations).
Krashen, S. 1999. Seeking a role for grammar: A review of some recent studies. Foreign Language 32(2): 245-257.
Truscott, J. (2004). The effectiveness of grammar instruction: Analysis of a meta-analysis. English Teaching & Learning, 28(3), 17-29.
Truscott, J. 2007. Grammar teaching and the evidence: A response to Nassaji and Fotos (2004). International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching 3(1) 10-22. (ijflt.com)
Truscott, J. (1996) The case against grammar correction in L2 writing classes. Language Learning 46 (2), 327-369.
Truscott, J. (2005). The continuing problems of oral grammar correction. International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching, 1(2), 17-22.
***
Fifth, many critics, including Gregg (1984) and McLaughlin (1978) say that you don’t clarify what you mean by “conscious” and “subconscious”. Specifically, does “subconscious” mean “not accessible to the conscious”, or simply “not conscious at a given moment”? Does “conscious” entail “incapable of becoming unconscious”? If you define the “subconscious” as inaccessible, and conscious “learning” as always accessible, then the claim that learning does not become acquisition is of course true, but only trivially so because you make it so. But if (some) unconscious knowledge can be brought to consciousness, and if conscious knowledge is capable of becoming unconscious, then unless you offer evidence, which you don’t, there’s no reason to accept your claim.
Finally, you say that acquisition “always (sic) requires large amounts of time and input data”, but you don’t give any evidence for this claim. There are many examples (see Gregg, 1984 for some) of acquistion which is fast and requires little input data.

***
MY RESPONSE: Yes, agreed – there are instances of rapid acquisition, eg “fast mapping.” In fact, the superiority of comprehensible input-based methods as well as “efficiency” analyses done by Beniko Mason suggest that acquisition is faster than conscious learning (benikomason.net).
The Monitor

***
In your 1982 work you say “Learning has only one function, and that is as a Monitor, or editor”. In Krashen 1981,1982,1983, 1985, you clearly state that the Monitor Hypothesis claims that “learning” is available only for use in production, not in comprehension. Last week in our exchange on this blog, I asked you “Is it right to say that the Monitor hypothesis claims that learning is available for use in production, but not in comprehension?” You replied “NO. It is available as a Monitor, but it is possible that conscious knowledge can make input more comprehensible. There has been no investigation of this possibility, to my knowledge”. I don’t get this and I hope you’ll address it in a reply. For the moment let me say that, in my opinion, the claim made for the Monitor (as I still understand it from re-reading your work) is an extraordinary one for which you offer no evidence. We may note that McLaughlin (1978) makes the same point, and that you don’t deal with it in your reply (1979) to him.
Gregg gives this example as evidence against your claim:
“The other day while listening to the radio, I heard the announcer announce wagunaa no kageki, kamigami no kasoware. Knowing that kageki = ‘opera’ and that kami = either ‘god’ or ‘hair’ or ‘paper’, and knowing that there is a (fairly unproductive) rule in Japanese for pluralizing by reduplication, I concluded that kamigami must be the plural of kami ‘god’, that therefore wagunaa must be Wagner and kasoware must mean ‘twilight,’ and that I as in danger of hearing Die Gotterdammerung. Of course I was not quite right: there is no word kasoware, it’s tasogare. But the point is that I was using a rule that I had ‘learned’ (and never used productively), and using that rule consciously (and quickly enough to turn the radio off in time). … Of course I was using acquired knowledge, but I was also consciously making use of rules that I had “learned”. Which suggests that “learning” can indeed be used in comprehension, as no one before Krashen would have doubted.”
Do you insist that learning cannot be used in comprehension?
***

MY RESPONSE In my last post, I agreed that this is possible. I agreed then and I agree now. (By the way, this does not affect the claim that conscious knowledge is used as a Monitor.)

***
The extreme conditions you impose on Monitor use means that, as you say “for most people, even university students, it takes a real discrete-point grammar-type test to meet all three conditions for Monitor use .. .’ (1982:18). This suggests that under normal conditions, the Monitor isn’t used, which, coupled with the fact that the Input Hypothesis claims that we learn a language through comprehension, throws doubt on the Acquisition / Learning distinction. The “two distinct and independent ways” adults have of developing competence in a second language are extremely lop-sided: “learning” in your model accounts for very little indeed of the SLA process.

***

MY RESPONSE

This does not throw doubt on the acquisition-learning distinction at all. The finding that conscious learning is hard to use, and does not become “acquired” means that language acquisition is something the brain does very well, and language learning is something the brain does not do well. Lop-sided, for sure. But consistent with the data.
***

The Natural Order Hypothesis
The Natural Order Hypothesis suggests that “Second language acquirers acquire (not learn) grammatical structures in a predictable order” (Krashen 1980:169). Your case is based mainly on results of morpheme studies, but, as Gregg (1984) and Wode et.al.(1978) point out, the acquisition of morphemes in the same order doesn’t entail that the acquisition of, for example, relative pronouns, indirect object placement, or epistemic modals is ordered, either in respect to those grammatical morphemes, or in respect to each other. In recognition of this objection, you say in a footnote “Wode et al (1978) note that ordering studies might be overly concerned with determining relative order of acquisition of items that are formally quite different’ (1981:63).

***
MY RESPONSE:
A number of studies have found predictable order of acquisition for a variety of aspects of grammar in English and in other languages. One would expect the same principles to underlie all these orders, but this remains to be seen. Nor do we know if morpheme orders are completely independent of orders for aspects of syntax.

***
If we took a simple view of the Natural Order Hypothesis we would suppose that the learner acquiring the thousands of structures of English does so by progressing from the first to the latest, starting from Structure 1 and reaching, let’s say, Structure 1,678. You say that “a strictly linear view of the natural order hypothesis, that there is only one stream of progress that acquirers follow in strict sequence” is incorrect. Rather, “several streams of development are taking place at the same time” (1982:53-4). But you give no explanation of what a “stream of development” could be, or set any limit on the number of such “streams”.

***
MY RESPONSE:
How on earth could I set a limit on the number of streams? I suggested that there may be streams. Are you insisting that all suggestions, all conjectures, all hypotheses come with precise details, overwhelming supporting evidence, and refutations to all possible counterexamples?

***

Let me quote Gregg (1984) again:
If the structures of English are divided into varying numbers of ordered sets, the number of sets varying according to the individual, then it makes little sense to talk about a ‘natural order’.

MY RESPONSE
“Varying according to the individual”? I never said that. It is an empirical question.

If the number of sets varies from individual to individual; then the membership of any given set will also vary, which makes it very difficult to compare individuals, especially since the content of these sets is virtually completely unknown

MY RESPONSE
Again, I have never made claims about variation in number of streams according to the individual.

***

If the set of sets of structures is claimed to be invariant across individual – that is, if it is claimed that there is one (unknown) fixed number of ‘streams of development’ – the problem of comparability would be removed, but the problem of empirical support for the hypothesis remains; in fact it becomes even greater.

MY RESPONSE:

The “problem of empirical support” is not a problem. It is an invitation to do research.

***
If on the other hand one rejects the criterion of comparability across individuals, the Natural Order Hypothesis has no empirical content: for any individual it would claim that the acquisition of structure n+ 1 was the next structure to be acquired, and this would be true ex hypothesis, but it would be impossible to prove it or falsify it.

MY RESPONSE:
If we find that i+1 is reasonably similar for everybody at stage i. this would be strong support for the natural order hypothesis.

***

Another issue is the utility of this hypothesis. What is it for? The hypothesis can hardly be used to organize a syllabus which coincides with the natural order because nobody knows what this natural order is. And in any case, you have always rejected grammatical sequencing as an organising principle for an ELT syllabus.

MY RESPONSE:
What is it for? It makes a fundamental claim about the underlying process of second language acquisition. Dulay and Burt emphasized this in their first report of the natural order in child second language acquisition.
DULAY, H. and BURT, M. (1974) Natural sequences in child second language acquisition. Language Learning 24: 37-53.

**
By the way, the fact that nobody knows what the natural order of English structures is (plus the fact that nobody knows when the monitor is working and when it’s not) makes “finding a natural accuracy order in a highly monitored situation, or finding an unnatural accuracy order in a spontaneous unmonitored situation” impossible. The attempt to “show a change in the natural order related to affect” is similarly bound to fail. These were 2 examples you gave in reply to my request for a conterexample which would falsify your hypotheses.

MY RESPONSE
RE: “Nobody knows what the natural order is.” There is very good evidence for a natural order for some structures, and I took advantage of this in hypothesizing when the monitor is working or not.

***
The Input Hypothesis
The Input Hypothesis claims that we acquire by understanding language that contains structure a bit beyond our current level of competence (i+ 1). This is done with the help of context or extra-linguistic information. When communication is successful, when the input is understood and there is enough of it, i+1 will be provided automatically.
One claim which comes from this hypothesis is that output does not help acquisition, except indirectly. Where is the evidence for this surprising claim, which contradicts the common opinion (which may of course be totally unfounded) that practice is necessary for second language acquisition? Why do you assume that learners can’t learn from their own utterances?

MY RESPONSE
Where is the evidence? It appears throughout my publications over the decades. The latest: Rahim Sari in IJFLT, (ijflt.com), vol 8,(1). 2013. Se evidence in: Krashen, S. 1994. The input hypothesis and its rivals. In N. Ellis (Ed.) Implicit and Explicit Learning of Languages. London: Academic Press. pp. 45-77; Krashen, S. 2014. Case Histories and the Comprehension Hypothesis. TESOL Journal (www.tesol-journal.com), June, 2014
Available at: http://www.sdkrashen.com/articles.php?cat=6

Can we acquire from our own output?
This is a theoretical possibility, but so far, we don’t know if it has actually happened or can happen. If a second language acquirer monitors and produces a spoken or written sentence that contains a rule that is at that acquirer’s i+1, and the acquirer understands what he or she has written, this sentence might be able serve as comprehensible input and help lead to the acquisition of that rule.
If acquiring from your own output is possible, it would open the door to a bizarre kind of pedagogy: find out what is at each student’s i+1 and set up production activities that require the use of the target rule. Of course, this “new” pedagogy would look a lot like traditional instruction.
One could argue that traditional instruction, however, failed to produce real acquired competence because we didn’t know what each student’s i+1 was, and because we just didn’t demand enough output.
Even if “acquire from your own output” could be shown to work, I suspect that most people would far prefer to get fresh input from others, with interesting messages, rather than constantly recycle their own production.

***

A second claim is that we acquire a previously unacquired structure if and only if that structure is present in input that we understand; that structure is ‘due’ to be acquired next; and that structure is presented (in understood input) sufficiently often. Since we don’t know when a structure is ready to be acquired, and since you give no definition of “ready”, this claim can’t be either supported or challenged by empirical evidence.

MY RESPONSE:
It is consistent with a lot of research, as presented in Input Hypothesis (1985), especially chapter one and in a recent paper (below). It is a reasonable hypothesis. You are demanding a level of precision that is unprecented in our field and reject all indirect evidence.
Krashen, S. 2013 The Case for Non-Targeted, Comprehensible Input. Journal of Bilingual Education Research & Instruction 15(1): 102-110. (available at http://www.sdkrashen.com, “Language Acquisition” section).
***
In general, what evidence supports the assertion that acquisition is caused by understanding comprehensible input? What theory explains how we go from understanding to acquisition? Without addressing these issues, the Input Hypothesis has no explanatory power.

MY RESPONSE:
Perhaps this paper may be of interest (ignorance hypothesis) in explaining how we move from comprehension to acquisition. As for: “In general, what evidence supports the assertion that acquisition is caused by understanding comprehensible input?” see hundreds of my publications over the last few decades.
Krashen, S. 1983. Newmark’s “ignorance hypothesis” and current second language acquisition theory. In S. Gass and L. Selinker (Eds.) Language Transfer in Language Learning. New York: Newbury House. pp. 135-153. (available at http://www.sdkrashen.com, “Language Acquisition” section)

***
The Affective Filter Hypothesis
The Affective Filter Hypothesis claims that there is such a thing as an affective filter, which is ‘that part of the internal processing system that subconsciously screens incoming language based on… the learner’s motives, needs, attitudes, and emotional states’ (Dulay, Burt, and Krashen 1 982:46). The hypothesis also claims that ‘the effect of affect is “outside” the language acquisition device proper’ (Krashen 1982:32).
As mentioned above, the Affective Filter is supposed to explain incomplete mastery of a second language by adults, and so the question arises why doesn’t the Filter work in children? You’ve said that that “significant Monitor use is only possible after the acquirer has undergone formal operations a stage in cognitive development that generally occurs at about puberty” and that “Having reached this stage, the adolescent now has a meta-awareness of his ideas and can use abstract rules to solve a whole class of problems at one time. It is thus plausible that the ability to use a conscious grammar … comes as a result of formal operations” (1981:35). Crucial to this otherwise very unconvincing account are “formal operations”. What are they?

RESPONSE:
Formal operations comes from Piaget. I described formal operations in several books and papers and provide citations. And I discussed how formal operations contributes to the establishment of the affective filter. See e.g: Krashen, S. 1982. Accounting for child-adult differences in second language acquisition. In S. Krashen, R. Scarcella, and M. Long (Eds.) Child-Adult Differences in Second Language Acquisition. New York: Newbury House.

***

You say the Filter determines which parts of the language will be attended to first. What does “part of a language” mean? How does the Filter recognize different “parts of a language”?
RESPONSE
I no longer think this is true.

***
In general, you don’t explain either the growth or function of the Affective Filter, or provide any evidence for its existence.

RESPONSE
Of course I do. See above citation, and chapter 2 in Second Language Acquisition and Second Language Learning.

***
A theory of language
Gregg (1984) insists that “a theory of second language acquisition must include a linguistic theory if it is to have any value as a theory”. He says: “Aside from throwing out a reference to ‘LAD’ from time to time, Krashen has no such theory, and this is what makes him unable to interpret the morpheme studies, or to present a coherent account of what ‘i+ 1′ could mean. As Chomsky says, ‘It is absolutely suicidal for a field to define itself the way psychology of language almost invariably does, as dealing with processes but not with the structures that might enter into them, or to deal with the observed stages of growth and development, but not with the systems that underlie them’ (Chomsky 1982:69)”.

RESPONSE
Gregg has complained that I have not integrated grammatical theory into my work. No I haven’t, but others have, eg Schwartz, and discussions contributed by L. White and others.

***
A theory of SLA
Here, I repeat the criticisms I made in my original post. Firstly, most of the propositions in your theory are not capable of being subjected to an empirical test. There is no way of testing the Acquisition-Learning hypothesis since you give no evidence to support the claim that two distinct systems exist, or any means of determining whether they are, or are not, separate. Similarly, there is no way of testing the Monitor hypothesis: with no way to determine whether the Monitor is in operation or not, it is impossible to determine the validity of its claims. The Input Hypothesis is equally incapable of being tested: the levels of knowledge are nowhere defined and so it is impossible to know whether i + 1 is present in input, and, if it is, whether or not the learner moves on to the next level as a result.

RESPONSE:
What this means is that you are not satisfied with the evidence I have presented. More fundamentally it means that we disagree on how research should be done.

***
Secondly, you provide no causal explanation. At the heart of the hypotheses is the Acquisition-Leaning Hypothesis which simply states that L2 competence is picked up through comprehensible input in a staged, systematic way, without giving any explanation of the process by which comprehensible input leads to acquisition. Similarly, you give no account of how the Affective Filter works, of how input is filtered out by an unmotivated learner.
Thirdly, your use of key terms, such as “acquisition and learning”, and “subconscious and conscious”, is vague, confusing, and not always consistent.
Fourthly, I think the theory is contained in the Input Hypothesis and the Monitor Hypothesis, and that the other hypotheses serve to rescue these two hypotheses from criticism. This implies that the theory offends the principle of Occam’s Razor, which expects theories to use the simplest possible formula and to postulate the fewest number of basic types of entity.

RESPONSE
Occam’s Razor does not say we want the simplest theory, it says we want the simplest theory consistent with the data. Is it preferable to not make a distinction between short and long-term memory because it would be”simpler”? How about just saying e = mc, and simplifying pi to 22/7?

***
Finally, I should mention your response to one of my questions to you last week. You said:
According to a pure Popperian view the hundreds of confirmations of the hypotheses count for nothing – but I think they are good evidence supporting the hypotheses. EG: More comprehensible input consistently results in better competence in adult second language, child second language, native language, literacy. Comprehension-based methods have won EVERY method-comparison study ever done, for beginners and intermediates, sustained silent reading is a steady winner in L1 and L2 studies over traditional literacy instruction (in some short term studies, there is no difference, which makes sense, it takes a while for students to find a book), in multivariate studies self-selected reading is always a strong predictor of competence on several tests while instruction does poorly. There are no exceptions. Any exception would be serious counter-evidence to the comprehension hypothesis.
I agree entirely that supporting evidence is extremely inportant when assessing a hypothesis or theory (and I thus expect you to give evidence in support of the assertions made in your theory). Of course, Popper himself did not dismiss the need for supporting evidence, and, furthermore, very few scholars in the field of the philosophy of science today accept the original strong version of the Falsifiability hypothesis. Pace Popper, scientific theories rely as much on inference (inference to the best explanation) as they do on deduction and testing for counter evidence. But we need more information in order to judge for ourselves whether the examples you give of confirmations of your hypotheses are robust. So, for example, when you say “More comprehensible input consistently results in better competence in adult second language, child second language, native language, literacy”, we need to know how you ensured that the input was comprehensible, how you measured “competence” before and after the trial, how strong the correlation was and how you are sure that the comprehensible input caused the increased competence.

RESPONSE
1. How I insured that input is comprehensible. At this stage of our knowledge, we can’t do this precisely. Maybe some measure of brain activity would work. Tough to do this without making the situation very artificial.
2. How competence is measured. This is described in all studies.
3. Strength of correlation. This is reported in all empirical studies, and whenever possible measures of effect size are reported. When other scholars do not report effect sizes, I always try to calculate them and report them in my papers, eg Krashen, S. 2007. Extensive reading in English as a foreign language by adolescents and young adults: A meta-analysis. International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching 3 (2): 23-29. (available at: IJFLT.com)
4. How I am sure that the comprehensible input caused the increased competence. I am not “sure,” but I think it is highly likely, because results are so similar in so many studies: see appendix to this response below.
Concerning Popper:
In second language acquisition, my impression is that most of the scholars publishing in the “prestige” journals do indeed follow Popper’s philosophy and pay little or no attention to supporting data. Study after study has been published attemting to show that
1. instruction works
2. error correction works
3. comprehensible output works.
These are all attempts to falsify one or more of the hypotheses I have proposed.
I have responded to many of these attempts, pointing out that (1) the results are fully consistent with the hypotheses I have proposed; (2) researchers have focused on and have overinterpreted the scraps of apparently falsifying evidence, (3) have stated conclusions inconsistent with their own data.

Very little attention has been paid to the many studies confirming the predictions made by the hypotheses, including the many method comparison studies (see appendix), multivariate studies and case histories. And critics of the theory seem to be unaware of research outside of their own narrow area, especially literacy development.

APPENDIX: Results are so similar in many studies –
Below is a list of studies comparing comprehension-based methods with traditional methods that demand the conscious learning of grammar. The list includes studies contrasting comprehension-based methods with traditional methods for beginning foreign language teaching and intermediate foreign and second language teaching, as well as studies showing the superiority of self-selected reading over traditional instruction for intermediate second and foreign language students.
All studies included comparison groups and subjects were high school age or older. In addition, there are a multitude of studies that confirm these results using multivariate techniques and case histories (Krashen, 2004, Explorations). See also: Krashen, S. 2014. Case Histories and the Comprehension Hypothesis. TESOL Journal (www.tesol-journal.com), June, 2014
Available at: http://www.sdkrashen.com/articles.php?cat=6

References
Krashen, S. 2004. Explorations in Language Acquisition and Use. Portsmouth: Heinemann.

BEGINNING FOREIGN LANGUAGE
Asher, J. 1965. The strategy of the total physical response: an application to learning Russian. International Review of Applied Linguistics 3: 291-300.
Asher, J. 1969. The total physical response approach to second language learning. Modern Language Journal 53: 3-17.
Asher, J. 1972. Children’s first language as a model for second language learning. Modern Language Journal 56: 133-139.
Asher, J., Kusudo, J. and De La Torre, R. 1974, Learning a second language through commands: the second field test. Modern Language Journal 58: 24-32.
Dziedzic, J. 2012. A comparison of TPRS and traditional instruction, both with SSR. International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching 7(2): 4-6.
Hammond, R. 1989. Accuracy versus communicative competency: The acquisition of grammar in the second language classroom. Hispania 71: 408-417
Isik, A. 2000. The role of input in second language acquisition: more comprehensible input supported by grammar instrution or more grammar instruction? ITL: Review of Applied Linguistics 129-130: 225-74.
Kunihara A, S. and Asher, J. 1965. The strategy of the total physical response: an application to learning Japanese. International Review of Applied Linguistics 4: 277-289.
Nicola, N. 1989. Experimenting with the new methods in Arabic. Dialog on Language Instruction. 6: 61-71.
Swaffer, J. and Woodruff, M. 1978. Language for comprehension: Focus on reading. Modern Language Journal 6:27-32.
Varguez, K. 2009. Traditional and TPR Storytelling instruction in the Beginning High School Spanish Classroom. International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching 5 (1): 2-11.
Watson, B. 2009. A comparison of TPRS and traditional foreign language instruction at the high school level. International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching 5 (1): 21-24.
Winitz, H. 1996. Grammaticality judgments as a function explitict and implicit instruction in Spanish. Modern Language Journal 80 (1): 32-46.
Wolfe, D. and Jones, G. 1982. Integrating total physical response strategy in a level 1 Spanish class. Foreign Language Annals 14: 273-80.

INTERMEDIATE FOREIGN LANGUAGE: SHELTERED
Burger, S. 1989. Content-based ESL in a sheletered psychology course: Input, output, and outcomes. TESL Canada Journal 6:45-59.
Edwards, H., Wesche, M., Krashen, S., Clement, R., and Kruidenier, B. 1984. Second language acquisition through a subject-matter learning: A study of sheltered psychology classes at the University of Ottawa. Canadian Modern Language Review 41: 268-282.
Hauptman, P., Wesche, M., and Ready, D. 1988. Second language acquisition through subject-matter teaching: a follow-up study at the University of Ottawa. Language Learning 38: 433-71.
Lafayette, R. and Buscaglia, M. 1985. Students learn language via a civilization course – a comarison of second language acquisition environments. Studies in Second Language Acquisition 7: 323-42.
Sternfeld, S. 1993. Immersion in first-year language instruction for adults. In J. Oller (Ed.) Methods That Work. Boston: Heinle and Heinle.

INTERMEDIATE FOREIGN LANGUAGE: SUSTAINED SILENT READING
Bell, T. 2001. Extensive reading: Speed and comperhension. The Reading Matrix, 1 (1)
Hitosugi, C. I., and Day, R. 2004. Extensive reading in Japanese. Reading in a Foreign Language 16 (1). http://nflrc.hawaii.edu/rfl/April2004/abstracts.html#hitosugi
Hafiz, F., and I. Tudor. 1990. Graded readers as an input medium in L2 learning. System 18(1): 31-42.
Lao, C.Y. and Krashen, S. 2000. The impact of popular literature study on literacy development in EFL: More evidence for the power of reading. System 28: 261-270.
Lee, S.Y. 2007. Revelations from three consecutive studies on extensive reading. RELC Journal 38 (2), 150-170.
Lee, S. Y. and Hsu, Y. Y. 2009. A three-year longitudinal study of in-class sustained silent reading with Taiwanese vocational college students. Indonesian Journal of English Language Teaching, 5(1): 15-29.
Lituanas, P. M., Jacobs, G. M., and Renandya, W. A. 1999. A study of extensive reading with remedial reading students. In Y. M. Cheah & S. M. Ng (Eds.) Language instructional issues in Asian classrooms (pp. 89-104). Newark, DE: International Development in Asia Committee, International Reading Association.
Liu, C.K. 2007. A reading program that keeps winning. Selected Papers from the Sixteenth International Symposium on English Teaching, English Teachers’ Association – Republic of China. Taipei: Crane Publishing Company.
Mason, B. 2006. Free voluntary reading and autonomy in second language acquisition: Improving TOEFL scores from reading alone. International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching 2(1), 2-5.
Mason, B. and Krashen, S. 1997. Extensive reading in English as a foreign language. System 25: 91-102.
Robb, T. N. & Susser, B. 1989. Extensive reading vs skills building in an EFL Context. Reading in a Foreign Language, 5, 2, 239-51.
Rodrigo, V., Krashen, S., and Gribbons, B. 2004. The effectiveness of two comprehensible-input approaches to foreign language instruction at the intermediate level. System 32(1): 53-60.
Sheu, S. P-H. 2004. Extensive reading with EFL learners at beginning level. TESL Reporter, 36(2), 8-26.
Sims, J. 1996. A new perspective: Extensive reading for pleasure. The Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium on English Teaching, pp. 137-144. Taipei: Crane Publishing Company.
Smith, K. 2006. A comparison of “pure” extensive reading with intensive reading and Extensive Reading with Supplementary Activities. International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching (IJFLT), 2(2): 12-15.
Smith, K. 2007. The effect of adding SSR to regular instruction. Selected Papers from the Sixteenth International Symposium on English Teaching, English Teachers’ Association – Republic of China. Taipei: Crane Publishing Company.
Smith, K. 2011. Integrating one hour of in-school weekly SSR: Effects on proficiency and spelling. International Journal of Foreign Language Teaching, 7(1): 1-7.
Tudor, I., and Hafiz, F. 1989. Extensive reading as a means of input to L2 learning. Journal of Research in Reading 12(2): 164-178.
Tsang, W-K., 1996. Comparing the effects of reading and writing on writing performance. Applied Linguistics 17(2): 210-233.
Yuan, Y. P., and Nash, T. 1992. Reading subskills and quantity reading. Selected papers from The Eighth Conference on English Teaching and Learning in the Republic of China, pp. 291-304. Taipei: Crane.

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